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Abstract
We consider the extension of Gödel logic by a unary operator interpreted by functions on the unit interval with certain monotonicity
properties. We prove that validity of propositional formulas is decidable by giving a sound and complete proof system with finitely
many axioms. We show also how to transfer the deduction theorem, the lifting lemma and the agreement of entailment and 1-
entailment from Gödel logic to the propositional fragment of our extension. Finally, we prove an enumerability result for a ring-normal
prenex fragment.
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1. Introduction
The main motivation for this paper is the investigation of the phase transition between first-order Gödel logic, which
is recursively enumerable, and Łukasiewicz logic, which by Scarpellini’s result [14] is not. (For a general discussion
of phase transition in logic cf. [15,16].) Another aim is to describe geometric properties in the context of extensions of
t-norm based logics whose propositional fragment admits axiomatisation. We carry this task out for Gödel logic.
Both Gödel and Łukasiewicz logics are important t-norm fuzzy logics [10] and their propositional fragments can be
characterised by well-behaved proof systems; see [13] for Łukasiewicz logic, see [8] for a characterisation of Gödel
logic as an intermediate logic, and see [1,12] for analytic calculi. While valid formulas in first-order Gödel logic are
recursively enumerable due to a sound and complete proof system with finitely many axiom schemes [11], they are not
recursively enumerable in first-order Łukasiewicz logic [14], in fact, Π2-complete. For a better understanding of this
phenomenon, we present in [3] an extension of Gödel logic with a unary operator that is interpreted as the addition of
a fixed value from the unit interval to the truth-value of its argument; values exceeding 1 are rounded down to 1. This
logic is described in detail in [9]. Remarkable features of this logic shared by Łukasiewicz logic are that:
(1) the valid propositional formulas can be characterised by an astoundingly simple Hilbert-type proof system and
that
(2) the first-order extension (actually its prenex fragment) is not recursively enumerable.
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Moreover, we provide there an evaluation algorithm originating in [8] that constructs proofs for every valid propositional
formula and we prove that neither entailment nor 1-entailment is a compact relation. In Theorem 3.12 of this paper,
we answer the question positively whether the aforementioned addition of a fixed value can be generalised to a larger
function class without losing the characterisability by a proof system with finitely many axioms. Indeed, the proof
thereof is much simpler than in the setting of [3].
The paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2, we will define the semantics of the new unary operator
and prove basic properties of Gödel-interpretations. We will introduce two function classes: one that leads to Theorem
3.12 for propositional logic and one that permits a partial result for a first-order fragment. In Section 3, we will consider
only the propositional fragment: we will introduce the proof system GP◦ and show that every formula is GP◦ -provably
equivalent to a normal form, where no scope of any ring contains a binary connective. An application of Dummett’s
completeness theorem [8] for Gödel logic will finally yield Theorem 3.12. In order to slightly generalise it to the finite
strong completeness theorem in the sense of [7], we will define two appropriate definitions of entailment, which will
turn out to be equivalent, and we will transfer tools well-known from Gödel logic to the language with ring, e.g., the
deduction theorem and the lifting lemma. In Section 4, we will show that a proof system can characterise the valid
formulas of a certain prenex first-order fragment.
2. Ring interpretations
The logical connectives of all propositional and first-order languages considered here are ∧, ∨, ⊃, ⊥ with their usual
arity and a further logical connective ©, called ring, which is unary; ⊃ is understood to be right-associative. First-order
languages have quantifiers ∀ and ∃ in addition and may contain arbitrary many predicate and function symbols. We will
distinguish free and bound first-order variables. By L◦ we denote the extension of a language L by ©. We understand
¬A as an abbreviation for A ⊃ ⊥, A ↔ B for (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A),  for ⊥ ⊃ ⊥, and A ≺ B for (B ⊃ A) ⊃ B. We
define ©0 A := A and ©n+1 A := ©©n A for n ∈ N. Terms and formulas are defined in the usual way.
Definition 2.1. A Gödel-interpretation I of the propositional languageL is a mapping from the propositional variables
to [0,1]; we extend it to all formulas by
I(⊥) := 0,
I(A ∧ B) := min(I(A), I(B)),
I(A ∨ B) := max(I(A), I(B)),
I(A ⊃ B) := I(A) I(B),
where x  y := 1 for x ≤ y and x  y := y for x > y.
A Gödel-interpretation I of a first-order language L consists of (1) a nonempty set |I|, the domain of I, (2) a function
P I : |I|n → [0, 1] for each n-ary predicate symbol P in L, (3) a function f I : |I|n → |I| for each n-ary function symbol
f in L, and (4) a value aI ∈ V for each free variable a. If I is an interpretation of a first-order language L, let LI be
the extension of L by constant symbols for all elements of |I| and we define cI := c for all c ∈ |I|: We extend the
interpretation to terms and atoms by I( f (u1, …, un)) := f I(I(u1), …, I(un)) and I(P(t1, …, tn)) := P I(I(t1), …, I(tn)).
In addition to the definitions for propositional languages, use I(∀x A(x)) := inf{I(A(u)); u ∈ |I|} and I(∃x A(x)) :=
sup{I(A(u)); u ∈ |I|} to extend it to all formulas.
Let
Fs := { f : [0, 1] → [0, 1]; ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. x ≤ f (x); ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]. x < y ⇒ ( f (x) < f (y) ∨ f (y) = 1)};
and let
Fm := { f : [0, 1] → [0, 1]; ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. x ≤ f (x); ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]. x ≤ y ⇒ f (x) ≤ f (y)}.
Clearly, the identity belongs to Fs. Observe also that Fs ⊆ Fm holds: Suppose not, then there is f ∈ Fs and
0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1 such that f (x) > f (y). We cannot have x < y since this implies f (x) < f (y) or f (y) = 1, which are
both impossible. Thus x = y so that f (x) = f (y), which is absurd.
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Let us remark only in view of [3] that, for every c ≥ 0, the function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], x → min{1, x + c} belongs
to Fs: For all x ∈ [0, 1], we have x ≤ 1 and x ≤ x + c so that x ≤ f (x). For all x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that f (y) < 1 and
f (x) ≥ f (y), we have f (y) = y + c < 1 and x + c ≥ min{1, x + c} ≥ y + c and thus x ≥ y; this proves the second
property in Fs.
We will interpret © in a language L◦ by functions from Fs or Fm:
Definition 2.2. An Fs-resp. Fm-Gödel-interpretation I of a language L◦ is a Gödel-interpretation together with an
additional function rI ∈ Fs resp. rI ∈ Fm; the semantics of ©A is given by I(©A) := rI(I(A)) for all formulas A.
If the ring-free language L under consideration is clear from the context, I denotes the set of all interpretations of
L; for L◦, let Is be the set of all Fs-interpretations of L, and Is( f ) denotes the subset of all Fs-interpretations I with
rI = f . We define Im and Im( f ) in a similar way.
A formula A in a ring-free language is valid if I(A) = 1 holds for all interpretations I ∈ I. A formula A in a language
L◦ is Fs-valid if I(A) = 1 holds for all interpretations I ∈ Is( f ) for all f ∈ Fs. We define Fm-validity similarly.
Clearly, a ring-free formula isFs-valid resp.Fm-valid inL◦ if and only if it is valid inL. Observe that theFm-validity
of a formula A implies also its Fs-validity due to Fs ⊆ Fm.
It is easy to prove the following by case distinction.
Proposition 2.3. For every interpretation I, we have
I(A ↔ B) =
{
1 if I(A) = I(B),
min{I(A), I(B)} if I(A) = I(B),
and
I(A ≺ B) =
{
1 if I(A) < I(B),
I(B) if I(A) ≥ I(B).
Proposition 2.4. For every f ∈ Fm and I ∈ Im( f ), and, in particular, for every f ∈ Fs and I ∈ Is( f ), we have
(1) I(A ⊃ ©A) = 1,
(2) I(©(A  B) ↔ (©A ©B)) = 1 for every  ∈ {∧,∨},
(3) I(©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B)) = 1.
Moreover, for every f ∈ Fs and I ∈ Is( f ), we find
(4) I(©(A  B) ↔ (©A ©B)) = 1 for every  ∈ {⊃,≺}.
Proof. Since f ∈ Fm, we have I(A ⊃ ©A) = x  f (x) = 1 and hence (1) follows. Observe that the property
∀x, y. x ≤ y ⇒ f (x) ≤ f (y) implies f (min{I(A), I(B)}) = min{ f (I(A)), f (I(B))} and f (max{I(A), I(B)}) =
max{ f (I(A)), f (I(B))}. Since I(C ↔ D) = 1 if and only if I(C) = I(D), we find that (2) holds.
Let f ∈ Fm and I ∈ Im( f ); we claim I(©(A ⊃ B)) ≤ I(©A ⊃ ©B). We may assume I(A) ≤ I(B) since
I(A) > I(B) implies I(©(A ⊃ B)) = f (I(A)  I(B)) = f (I(B)) ≤ f (I(A))  f (I(B)) = I(©A ⊃ ©B). Since now
f (I(A)) ≤ f (I(B)), we find I(©(A ⊃ B)) ≤ 1 = f (I(A))  f (I(B)) = I(©A ⊃ ©B), as claimed. In particular, (3)
follows.
Let now f ∈ Fs and I ∈ Is( f ); we claim I(©A ⊃ ©B) = I(©(A ⊃ B)). Since I(©(A ⊃ B)) ≤ I(©A ⊃ ©B)
has been proved above, it suffices to show I(©A ⊃ ©B) ≤ I(©(A ⊃ B)). We may assume I(A) > I(B) for otherwise
I(A) ≤ I(B) establishes the claim by I(©A ⊃ ©B) ≤ 1 = f (1) = f (I(A)I(B)) = I(©(A ⊃ B)). We may also assume
f (I(A)) < 1 for otherwise the claim holds due to I(©A ⊃ ©B) = f (I(A))  f (I(B)) = 1  f (I(B)) = f (I(B)) =
f (I(A) I(B)) = I(©(A ⊃ B)). From f ∈ Fs, I(A) > I(B), and f (I(A)) < 1, we conclude f (I(A)) > f (I(B)). Hence
we find I(©A ⊃ ©B) = f (I(A))  f (I(B)) = f (I(B)) = f (I(A)  I(B)) = I(©(A ⊃ B)), as claimed. In particular,
the case  = ⊃ in (4) is now proved since we have I(C ↔ D) = 1 if and only if I(C) = I(D).
Using the equation I(©X ⊃ ©Y ) = I(©(X ⊃ Y )) proved above twice, we find I(©(A ≺ B)) = I(©((B ⊃ A) ⊃
B)) = I(©(B ⊃ A) ⊃ ©B) = I(©(B ⊃ A)) I(©B) = I(©B ⊃ ©A) I(©B) = I((©B ⊃ ©A) ⊃ ©B) = I(©A ≺
©B). Since we have I(C ↔ D) = 1 if and only if I(C) = I(D), this proves the case  = ≺ in (4). 
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Remark 2.5. We cannot strengthen part (3) of Proposition 2.4 since there is g ∈ Fm and I ∈ Im(g) such that
I((©A ⊃ ©B) ⊃ ©(A ⊃ B)) < 1: For I(A) := 23 , I(B) := 13 and the function g obtained from piecewise linear
interpolation of the points g(0) := 0, g( 13 ) := 23 , g( 23 ) := 23 , g(1) := 1, it is easily verified that g ∈ Fm and
I((©A ⊃ ©B) ⊃ ©(A ⊃ B)) = (g( 23 ) g( 13 )) g( 23  13 ) = 23 < 1.
3. The propositional fragment
Definition 3.1. Let (IPL) denote the following Hilbert-type proof system consisting of the rule
(MP) A A ⊃ B
B
and the axiom schemes
(IPL1) A ⊃ B ⊃ A (IPL6) A ⊃ B ⊃ (A ∧ B)
(IPL2) (A ⊃ B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C) (IPL7) A ⊃ (A ∨ B)
(IPL3) (A ⊃ C) ⊃ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ ((A ∨ B) ⊃ C) (IPL8) B ⊃ (A ∨ B)
(IPL4) (A ∧ B) ⊃ A (IPL9) ⊥ ⊃ A
(IPL5) (A ∧ B) ⊃ B
Moreover, let (LIN) denote the axiom scheme (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A).
We assume the reader to be familiar with (IPL) and we will therefore often omit simple derivations, in particular,
the application of (MP).
Definition 3.2. Let GP denote the proof system (IPL) + (LIN) in the language L.
One of our main results is the generalisation of the following proposition, which summarises the results of Dummett
[8], to the propositional language L◦ w.r.t. Fs-validity.
Proposition 3.3. In the ring-free propositional language, a formula A is valid w.r.t. Gödel semantics if and only if
GP  A. Indeed, a GP -proof can be constructed for every formula valid w.r.t. Gödel semantics.
Definition 3.4. Let GP◦ be the proof system in the propositional language L◦ that consists of (IPL), (LIN), and the
axiom schemes (©1) ©(A ⊃ B) ↔ (©A ⊃ ©B) and (©2) A ⊃ ©A.
The following proposition shows the soundness of GP◦ w.r.t. Fs-validity.
Proposition 3.5. If GP◦ proves an L◦-formula A, then A is Fs-valid.
Proof. The claim is established in the usual way by induction on proof length so that we leave the details to the reader.
Parts (4) and (1) of Proposition 2.4 show the validity of the axioms (©1) and (©2). It is a routine matter to check
soundness of (MP), (LIN) and all (IPL) axioms. The validity of the ring-free axioms and rules could also be deduced
from Proposition 3.3, although with extra care. 
We will now demonstrate the construction of a number of GP◦ -derivations that will enable us in Theorem 3.12 to
show the converse direction of Proposition 3.5. Observe for this purpose that, since the axiom schemes of GP◦ include
those of GP , a uniform substitution of L-variables by L◦-formulas in a GP -proof yields a GP◦ -proof (which employs
neither (©1) nor (©2)). To abbreviate some parts of GP◦ -derivations, we will merely claim the validity of a formula A
w.r.t. Gödel semantics, leave it to the reader to apply Proposition 3.3 to actually construct a GP -proof of A, and take
an L◦-instance of A that suits our needs.
Remark 3.6. As an example, we show that A⊃B B⊃CA⊃C is G
P◦ -derivable: Since the formula (A ⊃ B) ⊃ ((B ⊃ C) ⊃
(A ⊃ C)) is valid w.r.t. Gödel semantics, each of its L◦-instances is L◦-provable. Provided that L◦-proofs of A ⊃ B
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and B ⊃ C are given, we can compose them with (A ⊃ B) ⊃ ((B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ⊃ C)) by using (MP) twice to obtain a
proof of A ⊃ C .
Remark 3.7. It is well-known that GP can prove every instance of the equivalence scheme (A ↔ B) ⊃ (E[A] ↔
E[B]) for every L-context E[·] while, e.g., Hájek’s basic logic, Łukasiewicz or product logic cannot. We leave it to
the reader to verify that GP◦ proves every L◦-instance of the equivalence scheme for every L◦-context E[·]. However,
note that the aforementioned method of abbreviating a GP◦ -derivation is not enough by itself since the gap of E may
be in the scope of a ring.
Proposition 3.8. If GP◦  A  B and  ∈ {⊃,↔}, then GP◦  ©n A ©n B.
Proof. We only prove the case for n = 1 since then the result easily follows by induction on n.
(a) For  = ⊃, we obtain GP◦  ©(A ⊃ B) from GP◦  A ⊃ B by (©2). Applying (IPL4) to (©1), we find
GP◦  ©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B). Thus GP◦  ©A ⊃ ©B.
(b) For  = ↔, we obtain GP◦  A ⊃ B and GP◦  B ⊃ A from GP◦  A ↔ B by (IPL4) and (IPL5). As shown in
(a), GP◦  ©A ⊃ ©B and GP◦  ©B ⊃ ©A hold. Now, GP◦  ©A ↔ ©B follows from (IPL6). 
Proposition 3.9. GP◦  ©n(A  B) ↔ (©n A ©n B) for every  ∈ {∧,∨,⊃,≺,↔}.
Proof. We will abbreviate GP◦  X by  X in the remainder. For n = 0, it suffices to observe that GP  (A  B) ↔
(A  B). Next, we will focus on n = 1.
Since GP  (V ↔ V ′) ⊃ (U ↔ (V ⊃ W )) ⊃ (U ↔ (V ′ ⊃ W )), an appropriate instance of this formula together
with the (©1)-instances  ©(B ⊃ A) ↔ (©B ⊃ ©A) and  ©((B ⊃ A) ⊃ B) ↔ (©(B ⊃ A) ⊃ ©B) yields
 ©((B ⊃ A) ⊃ B) ↔ ((©B ⊃ ©A) ⊃ ©B). Thus  ©(A ≺ B) ↔ (©A ≺ ©B).
Applying Proposition 3.8 to (IPL6), we find ©A ⊃ ©(B ⊃ (A ∧ B)). From the (©1)-instance ©(B ⊃ (A ∧
B)) ↔ (©B ⊃ ©(A ∧ B)) and the GP -provable (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (Y ↔ (W ⊃ Z )) ⊃ ((X ∧ W ) ⊃ Z ), we obtain
 (©A ∧ ©B) ⊃ ©(A ∧ B). Applying Proposition 3.8 to (IPL4) and (IPL5), we find  ©(A ∧ B) ⊃ ©A and
 ©(A ∧ B) ⊃ ©B. From the GP -provable (Z ⊃ X ) ⊃ (Z ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (Z ⊃ (X ∧ Y )), we obtain  ©(A ∧
B) ⊃ (©A ∧ ©B). By (IPL6), we conclude  ©(A ∧ B) ↔ (©A ∧ ©B). By instantiating this formula, we see
 ©((X ⊃ Y ) ∧ (Y ⊃ X )) ↔ (©(X ⊃ Y ) ∧ ©(Y ⊃ X )). From the (©1)-instances ©(X ⊃ Y ) ↔ (©X ⊃
©Y ) and ©(Y ⊃ X ) ↔ (©Y ⊃ ©X ) and the GP -provable (U ↔ U ′) ⊃ (V ↔ V ′) ⊃ (Z ↔ U ∧ V ) ⊃
(Z ↔ U ′ ∧ V ′), we obtain  ©((X ⊃ Y ) ∧ (Y ⊃ X )) ↔ ((©X ⊃ ©Y ) ∧ (©Y ⊃ ©X )), i.e.,  ©(X ↔ Y ) ↔
(©X ↔ ©Y ).
Applying Proposition 3.8 to the GP -provable formulas (A ⊃ B) ⊃ ((A ∨ B) ⊃ B) and (B ⊃ A) ⊃ ((A ∨ B) ⊃ A),
we obtain ©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ ©((A ∨ B) ⊃ B) and ©(B ⊃ A) ⊃ ©((A ∨ B) ⊃ A). Together with four (©1)-instances
and the GP -provable formula (X ↔ Y ) ⊃ ((W ↔ Z ) ⊃ ((X ⊃ W ) ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z ))), we can distribute the rings over ⊃
and we obtain  (©A ⊃ ©B) ⊃ (©(A ∨ B) ⊃ ©B) and  (©B ⊃ ©A) ⊃ (©(A ∨ B) ⊃ ©A). Using an appropriate
instance of the GP -provable formula  ((X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (Z ⊃ U )) ⊃ ((Y ⊃ X ) ⊃ (Z ⊃ V )) ⊃ (Z ⊃ (U ∨ V )), we
find  ©(A ∨ B) ⊃ (©A ∨ ©B). Applying Proposition 3.8 to (IPL7) and (IPL8), we obtain  ©A ⊃ ©(A ∨ B) and
 ©B ⊃ ©(A ∨ B). By (IPL3),  (©A ∨ ©B) ⊃ ©(A ∨ B). Thus  ©(A ∨ B) ↔ (©A ∨ ©B) by (IPL6).
Suppose we have already proved  ©n(A  B) ↔ (©n A  ©n B), then  ©©n(A  B) ↔ ©(©n A  ©n B) holds
by Proposition 3.8. From  ©(©n A  ©n B) ↔ (©©n A  ©©n B), which has been proved above, and from the GP
provable (X ↔ Y ) ⊃ (Y ↔ Z ) ⊃ (X ↔ Z ), we conclude  ©n+1(A  B) ↔ (©n+1 A  ©n+1 B). This establishes
the claim for all n ∈ N. 
Definition 3.10. A formula A is in ring-normal form if every subformula of A with head symbol © neither contains ∧
nor ∨ nor ⊃, i.e., ring-powers can occur only directly in front of propositional variables or ⊥.
Proposition 3.11. For every formula A in the propositional language L◦, we can construct a formula A∗ such that
GP◦  A ↔ A∗ and A∗ is in ring-normal form.
Proof. Let p(A) denote the L-formula that arises from A by deleting all rings. We will proceed to prove the claim by
induction on the formula complexity of p(A).
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Let X be anL-formula such that S∗ has been constructed for every formula S whose p(S) properly precedes X in the
usual formula complexity order. We continue to construct A∗ for all A with p(A) = X . We may assume that A is not of
the form ©n B, where B is a propositional variable or ⊥, since then the claim follows from (IPL)  A ↔ A. Now, A is
of the form ©m(B C) for some m ∈ N and ∈ {∧,∨,⊃}. The induction hypothesis together with p(©m B) = p(B)
and p(©mC) = p(C) evidences that (©m B)∗ and (©mC)∗ have already been constructed and that GP◦  B ↔ B∗ and
GP◦  C ↔ C∗ hold. From an appropriate instance of the GP -provable formula (X ↔ X ′) ⊃ (Y ↔ Y ′) ⊃ (U ↔
(X  Y )) ⊃ (U ↔ (X ′  Y ′)), we see GP◦  A ↔ A∗, where A∗ := ((©m B)∗  (©mC)∗). This proves the claim as
A∗ indeed fulfils the requirements. 
The following theorem establishes a standard completeness theorem for GP◦ and is one of the main results of this
paper.
Theorem 3.12. Let A be a formula of the propositional language L◦. Then A is Fs-valid if and only if GP◦  A; the
implied GP◦ -proof can be constructed.
Proof. Soundness has already been proved in Proposition 3.5. It remains to show that we can construct a GP◦ -proof
of every Fs-valid formula A. A close inspection of the proof of Proposition 3.11 reveals that we can construct a GP◦ -
proof of A ↔ A∗, where A∗ is a formula in ring-normal form. From Proposition 3.5, we obtain | A ↔ A∗ so that
1 = I(A) = I(A∗) for all g ∈ Fs and I ∈ Is(g). We may therefore assume w.l.o.g. that A is a formula in ring-normal
form.
Let V denote the set of variables in A, then there are N ∈ N and an L-formula A− such that (1) A− has variables
in V ′ := {vi : 0 ≤ i ≤ N , v ∈ V } and (2) A = A−σ holds where σ is the substitution (vi/©iv)0≤i≤N , v∈V . Put
R := ∧((vn ⊃ vn+1) ∧ ((vn ≺ wm) ⊃ (vn+1 ≺ wm+1)) ∧ ((vn ⊃ wm) ⊃ (vn+1 ⊃ wm+1))); here, the conjunction
ranges over all v, w ∈ V and n, m ∈ {0, …, N − 1}.
We now show that the validity of R ⊃ A− w.r.t. L is sufficient for establishing the theorem. From the validity of
R ⊃ A−, we see by Proposition 3.3 that a GP -proof of R ⊃ A− can be constructed. Applying σ to each line in this
proof, we obtain a GP◦ -proof of Rσ ⊃ A. It remains to construct a GP◦ -proof of Rσ since then (MP) yields a GP◦ -proof
of A, which was claimed. The formulas (vn ⊃ vn+1)σ are instances of the GP◦ -axiom (©2). Observe now that, in the
proof of Proposition 3.9, the full GP◦ -proof of ©(A ≺ B) ↔ (©A ≺ ©B) is given. Applying (IPL4) and (©2) to this
and to (©1), we find GP◦ -proofs of (A ≺ B) ⊃ (©A ≺ ©B) and (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B). Thus we can construct
GP◦ -proofs of ((vn ≺ wm) ⊃ (vn+1 ≺ wm+1))σ and ((vn ⊃ wm) ⊃ (vn+1 ⊃ wm+1))σ since they are instances of
(A ≺ B) ⊃ (©A ≺ ©B) and (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B). Using (IPL6) several times, we find a proof of Rσ .
We will prove the validity of R ⊃ A− w.r.t. L in the remaining paragraphs. As explained before, this will establish
the theorem. Suppose R ⊃ A− is no validity, then there is a Gödel-interpretation J such that J(R ⊃ A−) < 1,
i.e., J(R) > J(A−). By the lifting lemma (see e.g., Lemma 3.4 in [4] and cf. our Proposition 4.4), we may assume
that 1 = J(R) > J(A−). Thus J(vn ♦ wm) ≤ J(vn+1 ♦ wm+1) and J(vn) ≤ J(vn+1) hold for all v, w ∈ V , n,
m ∈ {0, …, N − 1} and ♦ ∈ {≺,⊃}. In particular, J(vn) = J(wm) implies J(vn+1 ⊃ wm+1) = 1 = J(wm+1 ⊃ vn+1)
and thus J(vn+1) = J(wm+1). This property enables us to define a partial function f from [0, 1] to [0, 1] recursively as
follows: For x = J(vn) < 1, define f (x) := J(vn+1) and, moreover, put f (1) := 1. Let D be the set of all x ∈ [0, 1]
such that f (x) is defined.
Since J(vn) ≤ J(vn+1) holds for all v ∈ V and n ∈ {0, …, N − 1}, we see x ≤ f (x) for all x ∈ D. Next, we will
prove f (x) < f (y) or f (y) = 1 for all x, y ∈ D with x < y. Suppose not, there are x, y ∈ D such that x < y and
1 > f (y) ≤ f (x). Thus there exist vn, wm ∈ V ′ such that J(vn) < J(wm) and 1 > J(wm+1) ≤ J(vn+1). Therefore
1 = J(vn ≺ wm) ≤ J(vn+1 ≺ wm+1) holds so that J(vn+1) < J(wm+1) or J(wm+1) = 1, but both cases are impossible
so that our claim is established.
It is easy to see that the extension of f to [0, 1] by, e.g., piecewise linear interpolation is a function g ∈ Fs. Together
with I(v) := J(v0), this yields an interpretation I ∈ Is(g). By construction of I, we also see that J(F−) = I(F) holds
for all formulas F in ring-normal form; here F− is formed in the same way as A− above. Thus we obtain 1 > I(A)
from J(R) > J(A−), as required. 
Remark 3.13. Note that, in the construction in the last paragraph, the obtained g ∈ Fs is indeed continuous. Thus
GP◦  A if and only if A is valid w.r.t. all ring interpretations I with continuous rI ∈ Fs.
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Our next aim is to prove the finite strong completeness (in the sense of [7]) of GP◦ w.r.t.Fs-validity for the propositional
language with ring. For this slight extension of Theorem 3.12, we will now transfer important tools from Gödel logics
without ring to the one with ring, e.g., the deduction theorem, the lifting lemma, and the agreement of standard entailment
and the so-called 1-entailment.
Theorem 3.14. The deduction theorem holds for GP◦ : Let T be a set of formulas in L◦, let A be a finite set of formulas
in L◦, and let B be a formula in L◦. Then GP◦ + T + A  B if and only if GP◦ + T  (
∧
A) ⊃ B.
Proof. First, suppose we have GP◦ + T  (
∧
A) ⊃ B. From GP◦ + T + A  (
∧
A) ⊃ B by monotonicity and from
GP◦ + T + A  (
∧
A) by (IPL6), we obtain GP◦ + T + A  B. Thus it remains to show the converse direction; we
will prove this claim by induction on formula complexity.
This claim holds for every axiom B of GP◦ and every formula B contained in T since then GP◦ + T  B and thus
GP◦ + T  (
∧
A) ⊃ B by (IPL1) and (MP). The claim also holds for every formula B contained in A since then
GP◦ + T  (
∧
A) ⊃ B by (IPL4) and (IPL5). Thus the claim is established for all formulas whose GP◦ + T + A-proof
has length 1.
For the induction step, we will construct a GP◦ + T -proof of (
∧
A) ⊃ B for every formula B having a GP◦ + A + T -
proof of k steps, provided that (∧ A) ⊃ B ′ is GP◦ +T -provable for every formula B ′ with a GP◦ +A+T -proof of less than
k steps. By the above, we may assume that k > 1, in particular, B is no axiom of GP◦ and that neither A nor T contains B.
Thus B has a GP◦ +A+T -proof whose last line is (MP), i.e., there is a formula C such that GP◦ +A+T  C and GP◦ +A+
T  C ⊃ B. By assumption, we have GP◦ +T  (
∧
A) ⊃ C and GP◦ +T  (
∧
A) ⊃ (C ⊃ B). Since GP proves (X ⊃
D) ⊃ (X ⊃ (D ⊃ E)) ⊃ (X ⊃ E), GP◦ proves its instance ((
∧
A) ⊃ C) ⊃ ((∧ A) ⊃ (C ⊃ B)) ⊃ ((∧ A) ⊃ B). Ap-
plying (MP) two times, we find GP◦  (
∧
A) ⊃ B, as required. This establishes the claim and completes the proof of the
theorem. 
Lemma 3.15. In the propositional language with ring, the lifting lemma holds forFs-interpretations: For every I ∈ Is
and every d ∈ [0, 1], there is I′ ∈ Is such that I′(A) = hd (I(A)) for all formulas A; here hd (x) := x for x ≤ d and
hd (x) := 1 for x > d .
Proof. Define I′ by I′(P) := hd (I(P)) for all atoms P and by rI′ (x) := hd (rI(x)) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. By assumption, we
have rI ∈ Fs so that x ≤ rI(x) ≤ hd (rI(x)) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that x < y and
hd (rI(y)) < 1, we have rI(x) < rI(y) by rI ∈ Fs and hd (rI(y)) = rI(y) ≤ d by definition of hd so that then rI(x) < d
and thus hd (rI(x)) = rI(x) < rI(y) = hd (rI(y)). We obtain rI′ ∈ Fs from the last two properties so that I′ ∈ Is, as
claimed.
By the definition of formula evaluation under I′ and I, we find I′(©A) = hd (rI(A)) = hd (I(©A)) for all for-
mulas A. By case distinctions, we find without problems that hd (I(⊥)) = hd (0) = 0 = I′(⊥), hd (I(A ∨ B)) =
max{hd (I(A)), hd (I(B))}, hd (I(A ∧ B)) = min{hd (I(A)), hd (I(B))} and
hd (I(A ⊃ B)) =
{
1 if I(A) ≤ I(B) ∨ d < I(B)
I(B) if I(B) < I(A) ∧ I(B) ≤ d = hd (I(A)) hd (I(B))
hold for all formulas A, B in L◦. With these properties, it is easy to show I′(A) = hd (I(A)) for all formulas A by
induction on formula complexity. 
Definition 3.16. We will define entailment and 1-entailment here only for the propositional language with ring and only
for Gödel-Fs-semantics. We say that a set of formulas Γ entails a formula A and write Γ s A if inf B∈Γ I(B) ≤ I(A)
holds for all interpretations I; for Γ = ∅, we read inf B∈Γ I(B) as 1, i.e.,s A if and only if A isFs-valid. We say that a
set of formulas Γ 1-entails a formula A and write Γ 1s A if I(A) = 1 holds for all interpretations I such that I(B) = 1
for all B ∈ Γ ; in particular, 1s A if and only if A is Fs-valid.
The following proposition generalises [5, Proposition 2.2], also cf. [6] for a more general approach.
Proposition 3.17. Entailment and 1-entailment agree, i.e., we have Γ 1s A if and only if Γ s A for every set Γ of
formulas and every formula A.
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Proof. We may assume Γ = ∅ for otherwise the claim holds trivially.
Suppose we had Γ s A but Γ 1s A so that there is some interpretation I such that I(A) < 1 and I(B) = 1 for all
B ∈ Γ ; thus 1 = inf B∈Γ I(B) ≤ I(A) < 1, which is absurd.
Suppose we had Γ 1s A but Γ s A so that I(A) < inf B∈Γ I(B) for some interpretation I. Thus there is d ∈ [0, 1]
with I(A) < d < I(B) for all B ∈ Γ . By Lemma 3.15, there is I′ ∈ Is such that I′(A) = hd (I(A)) < d and
I′(B) = hd (I(B)) = 1 for all B ∈ Γ . From the latter and Γ 1s A, we find I′(A) = 1 contradicting I′(A) < d . This
completes the proof. 
We will now prove the finite strong completeness of GP◦ w.r.t. Gödel-Fs-semantics.
Theorem 3.18. We work in the propositional language with ring. Let Γ be a finite set of formulas and let A be a
formula. Then the following conditions are equivalent: (1) GP◦ + Γ  A. (2) GP◦  (
∧
Γ ) ⊃ A. (3) (∧Γ ) ⊃ A is
Fs-valid. (4) Γ s A. (5) Γ 1s A.
Proof. By the Deduction Theorem 3.14, (1) and (2) are equivalent. By Theorem 3.12, (2) and (3) are equivalent. By
Proposition 3.17, (4) and (5) are equivalent.
Observe that we have I((∧Γ ) ⊃ A) = (minB∈Γ I(B))  I(A) for all I ∈ Is. From the definition of , it is easy to
see that I((∧Γ ) ⊃ A) = 1 if and only if minB∈Γ I(B) ≤ I(A). This establishes the equivalence of (3) and (4).
4. First-order ring interpretations
Definition 4.1. Given a first-order language, let H denote the Hilbert-type proof system that contains (IPL), (LIN),
the rules B⊃A(a)B⊃∀x A(x) and
A(a)⊃B
∃x A(x)⊃B , where a is not free in B, and the axioms ∀x A(x) ⊃ A(t), A(t) ⊃ ∃x A(x) and∀x(B ∨ A(x)) ⊃ (B ∨ ∀x A(x)), where x is not free in B. By [11], H is sound and complete w.r.t. validity of Gödel
interpretations (without ©).
Definition 4.2. Let G◦ denote the extension of H by the axioms A ⊃ ©A and ©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B).
Proposition 4.3. If G◦ proves a formula A of a first-order language L◦, then A is Fm-valid.
Proof. The induction on the length of the derivation is routine. The validity of the ring-axioms was proved in
Proposition 2.4. 
We need another variant of the lifting lemma, this time for the prenex fragment.
Proposition 4.4. Let I be a Gödel interpretation in L and d ∈ (0, 1). Define a new interpretation Id by Id (A) :=
hd (I (A)) for all atoms A; here hd (x) := x for x ≤ d and hd (x) := 1 for x > d . Then Id (B) = 1 holds for all prenex
B with I(B) > d , and Id (B) = I(B) holds for all prenex B with I(B) < d . If B is a purely existential prenex formula,
then Id (B) = hd (I(B)).
Proof. The last sentence is a special case of, e.g., Lemma 3.4 in [4] or Lemma 1 in [2]. The lifting lemma also yields
hd (I(B)) = Id (B) for all quantifier-free B so that the claim of the proposition is established for all quantifier-free B.
We will prove the claim on induction on the length of the quantifier prefix: consider a formula Qx B(x), Q ∈ {∀, ∃},
such that the claim is already established for B(·). We need to distinguish four cases:
If I(∀x B(x)) < d holds, then I(∀x B(x)) ≤ I(B(c)) for all c ∈ |I| and, moreover, for every positive ε < d − I(∀x Bx)
there is c ∈ |I| such that I(B(c)) < I(∀x B(x)) + ε < d; from the induction hypothesis Id (B(c)) = I(B(c)), we
immediately obtain I(∀x B(x)) = Id (∀x B(x)).
If I(∃x B(x)) < d holds, then I(B(c)) ≤ I(∃x B(x)) < d for all c ∈ |I| so that, by the induction hypothesis, we have
Id (∃x B(x)) = supc∈|I| Id (B(c)) = supc∈|I| I(B(c)) = I(∃x B(x)), as desired.
If I(∀x B(x)) > d holds, then d < I(B(c)) for all c ∈ |I| so that, by the induction hypothesis, we have Id (∀x B(x)) =
infc∈|I| Id (B(c)) = infc∈|I| 1 = 1.
If I(∃x B(x)) > d holds, then I(B(c)) ≤ I(∃x B(x)) for all c ∈ |I|. Moreover, for every positive ε < I(∃x Bx) − d
there is c ∈ |I| such that d < I(∃x B(x)) − ε < I(B(c)); by the induction hypothesis, Id (B(c)) = 1 holds for these c so
that Id (∃x B(x)) = 1. 
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Note that the analogue of the following lemma would not be true for Fs instead of Fm since the strictly monotone
partial function f given by f ( 12 − 1n ) := 34 − 1n ≥ 12 − 1n , n ∈ N  {0, 1, 2}, and f ( 34 ) := 34 and f (1) := 1 has no
extension to a strictly monotone total function on [0, 1].
Lemma 4.5. Let F ′m := { f : X → [0, 1]; ∃X ⊆ [0, 1]; 1 ∈ X; ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. x ≤ f (x); ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]. x ≤ y ⇒
f (x) ≤ f (y)}. If f ∈ F ′m, then there is f1 ∈ Fm such that f ⊆ f1. Here g ⊆ h denotes that h extends or equals g.
Proof. We need to split the proof into several steps.
(1) If F ⊆ F ′m such that f1 ⊆ f2 or f2 ⊆ f1 holds for all f1, f2 ∈ F , then there is f ∈ F ′m such that f1 ⊆ f for all
f1 ∈ F .
For the proof, let f be the union of F , i.e., f (x) := f1(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] and f1 ∈ F such that x ∈ dom( f1).
This is well-defined since, whenever x ∈ dom( f1) ∩ ( f2) for f1, f2 ∈ F , we have f1 ⊆ f2 or f2 ⊆ f1, and thus
f1(x) = f2(x). If x ∈ dom( f ), we have x ≤ f (x) since there is f1 ∈ F with f (x) = f1(x) ≥ x . Since 1 ∈ dom( f1)
for all f1 ∈ F , we have f (1) = 1. If x, y ∈ dom( f ) and x ≤ y, then there are f1, f2 ∈ F with f (x) = f1(x)
and f (y) = f2(y). In the case f1 ⊆ f2, we see f (x) = f2(x) ≤ f2(y) = f (y); otherwise, f2 ⊆ f1 holds and then
f (x) = f1(x) ≤ f1(y) = f (y). In both cases, we obtain f (x) ≤ f (y).
(2) Suppose f ∈ F ′m such that x, y ∈ dom( f ), x < y and (x, y) ∩ dom( f ) = ∅. Then there is f1 ∈ F ′m such that
f ⊆ f1 and [x, y] ⊆ dom( f1).
Proof : Let f1 be the extension of f by linear interpolation between [x, y], i.e., f1(z) := ((y − z)/(y − x))
f (x) + ((z − x)/(y − x)) f (y) for z ∈ [x, y]. In particular f1(z) ≥ ((y − z)/(y − x))x + ((z − x)/(y − x))y =
(xy − xz+zy − xy)/(y − x) = z for all z ∈ [x, y]. Clearly, the monotonicity of f1 is inherited from f .
(3) Suppose f ∈ F ′m and there are x /∈ dom( f ) and an increasing sequence (yi )i∈N in dom( f ) such that x = supi yi .
Then there is f1 ∈ F ′m such that f ⊆ f1 and x ∈ dom( f1).
Proof : We claim that the extension by f1(x) := supi f (yi ) fulfils the desired properties. Clearly, x = supi yi ≤
supi f (yi ) = f1(x). It suffices to check monotonicity at x , so we need to distinguish two cases. If z < x with
z ∈ dom( f ), there is j such that z < y j , thus f1(z) = f (z) ≤ f (y j ) ≤ supi f (yi ) = f1(x). If x < z with z ∈ dom( f ),
then yi < z for all i and therefore f (yi ) ≤ f (z) for all i , hence f1(x) ≤ f (z).
(4) Suppose f ∈ F ′m and there are x /∈ dom( f ) and a decreasing sequence (yi )i∈N such that x = inf i yi . Then there
is f1 ∈ F ′m such that f ⊆ f1 and x ∈ dom( f1).
Proof : Completely symmetric to (3).
From (2) to (4), it follows that each non-total function in F ′m has a proper extension. Together with (1), a standard
application of Zorn’s lemma completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.6. If A is a prenex formula of a first-order language L◦ such that the quantifier free part of A is in
ring-normal form, then A is Fm-valid if and only if G◦  A.
Proof. We will only consider completeness here since soundness has been already proved in Proposition 4.3. We
therefore stipulate that A is Fm-valid and aim at proving G◦  A.
By assumption, A has the form Q1x1…Qq xq B[C1, …, CM ]; here Qi ∈ {∀, ∃}, B is a ring-free context with M gaps,
the Cm have the form ©km Pm(tm,1, …, tm,s(m)), where s(m) is the arity of a predicate symbol Pm , km ∈ N, and the tmj
are terms. Put K := 1 + maxm km .
Introduce fresh predicate symbols Pm,d with arity s(m) for 1 ≤ m ≤ M and 0 ≤ d ≤ K , and build the L-formula
A′ := Q1x1…Qq xq B[P1,k1 (t1,1, …, t1,s(1)), …, PM,kM (tM,1, …, tM,s(M))]. Observe that A can be obtained from A′
by replacing each Pm,d by the string ©d Pm .
Let Vn,d abbreviate Pn,d (x1, …, xs(n)) and let Wn,d,m,b abbreviate Pn,d (x1, …, xs(n)) ⊃ Pm,b(xs(n)+1, …,
xs(n)+s(m)); here d, b ∈ {0, …, K }, n, m ∈ {1, …, M} and the abbreviation is to be taken literally. Put E := 2 maxm s(m)
and define R := ∀x1…∀xE
∧((Vn,d ⊃ Vn,d+1) ∧ (Wn,d,m,b ⊃ Wn,d+1,m,b+1)), where the range of the conjunction is
d, b ∈ {0, …, K − 1} and n, m ∈ {1, …, M − 1}.
Obtain R1 from R by replacing each Pm,d by the string ©d Pm . We will prove G◦  R1: the first part of the conjunction
of R1 is of the form A ⊃ ©A, which is an axiom. Observe that the second part is of the form (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B).
We have G◦  (A ⊃ B) ⊃ ©(A ⊃ B) from the axiom X ⊃ ©X so that, together with the axiom ©(A ⊃ B) ⊃
(©A ⊃ ©B) and an appropriate instance of the GP -provable formula (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z ) ⊃ (X ⊃ Z ), we obtain
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G◦  (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B). Iterated applications of (IPL6) and the G◦-derivable rule B(a)↔C(a)∀x B(x)↔∀x C(x) now yield a
proof of R1 in G◦.
If H  R ⊃ A′, then also H  R1 ⊃ A and, since G◦  R1, we already find G◦  A as desired. Thus suppose
H  R ⊃ A′. In the remainder of this proof, we will prove by contradiction that this is impossible.
By [11], H is sound and complete w. r. t. validity of Gödel interpretations (without ©). Therefore there is an interpre-
tation J such that I(R ⊃ A′) < 1, i.e., there exists d such that J(R) > d > J(A′). By Proposition 4.4, we may assume
1 = J(R) > J(A′). In particular, J(Vn,d ) ≤ J(Vn,d+1) and J(Wn,d,m,b) ≤ J(Wn,d+1,m,b+1) hold for all x1, …,xE ∈ |I|.
It follows that for all x1, …, xE ∈ |I| such that J(Pn,d (x1, …, xs(n))) = J(Pm,b(xs(n)+1, …, xs(n)+s(m))), we have
J(Wn,d+1,m,b+1) = 1 = J(Wm,b+1,n,d+1) and thus J(Pn,d+1(x1, …, xs(n))) = J(Pm,b+1(xs(n)+1, …, xs(n)+s(m))).
Hence it is well-defined to specify a partial function f from [0, 1] to [0, 1] as follows: Put f (1) := 1 and f (y) :=
f (J(Pn,d+1(x1, …, xs(n)))) whenever there are y = J(Pn,d (x1, …, xs(n))) < 1, d ∈ {0, …, K − 1}, n ∈ {1, …, M − 1}
and x1, …, xs(n) ∈ |J|.
From J(Vn,d ) ≤ J(Vn,d+1) and f (1) = 1, we see that x ≤ f (x) holds for all x ∈ [0, 1]. We will prove f (x) ≤ f (y)
for all x, y ∈ dom( f ) such that x ≤ y. W.l.o.g. we may assume y < 1 for otherwise f (x) ≤ 1 = f (y). By definition,
there are d, b ∈ {0, …, K − 1}, n, m ∈ {1, …, M − 1} and x1, …, xs(n)+s(m) ∈ |J| such that x = J(Pn,d (x1, …, xs(n))),
and y = J(Pm,b(xs(n)+1, …, xs(n)+s(m))). As x ≤ y, we have J(Wn,d,m,b) = 1 and thus J(Wn,d+1,m,b+1) = 1, which
means f (x) ≤ f (y).
By Lemma 4.5, f can be extended to a function in Fm. Let now I be the Fm-interpretation that arises from J
and f . Since I(©k Pn(x1, …, xs(n))) = f k(I(Pn(x1, …, xs(n)))) = J(Pn,k(x1, …, xs(n))) holds for all k ∈ {0, …, K },
n ∈ {1, …, M} and all xi ∈ |J|, it is easy to show by induction on the formula complexity that I(A) = J(A′).
Hence, it follows I(A) = J(A′) < 1, but this contradicts the validity of A. This completes our proof. 
5. Future work
We are interested in the generalisation of Theorem 4.6 to the prenex fragment of predicate logic. (As shown in
[3], the valid formulas in the prenex fragment of predicate logic are not recursively enumerable if the ring operator
is interpreted by the addition of a fixed value.) In the case of recursive enumerability a further question concerns the
existence of an adequate analytic proof system.
We conclude with a short discussion of the conditions appearing in the definitions of the function classes Fs and
Fm. As the following comparison will show, the requirement x ≤ f (x) simplifies the proof-theoretic properties of
GP◦ significantly: Consider the class F ′s where x ≤ f (x) is replaced by f (1) = 1. It is easy to verify that the proof
system M := (IPL) + (LIN) + (©1) + the rule A©A is sound for all F ′s-Gödel-interpretations but that it can neither
derive A ⊃ ©A nor (A ↔ B) ⊃ (©A ↔ ©B). Hence, in contrast to GP◦ , neither the deduction theorem nor the
equivalence scheme introduced in Remark 3.7 can hold for M . However, from a semantical point of view, the condition
x < y ⇒ ( f (x) < f (y) ∨ f (y) = 1) alone seems to be a natural match to Gödel semantics as it reflects that Gödel-
interpretations commute with order-preserving functions on the truth-value set and that the value 1 cannot be crisply
distinguished, the latter fact being closely related to the lifting lemma.
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